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G. E. Moore remarked once in a lecture on the absurdity involved in saying something like "It's raining outside but I don't believe that it is." This paradox, sometimes known as Moore's paradox, might well have been forgotten if not for the fact that Ludwig Wittgenstein is reported to have considered it to be Moore's most important contribution to philosophy. There are two distinct versions of Moore's Paradox, the omissive and the commissive (terms popularized by Roy Sorensen[1]) typically distinguished according to their syntactic form. In addition, many commentators hold that Moore's Paradox arises not only at the level of assertion but also at the level of belief. The omissive and the commissive are so-called due to the kind of epistemic (relating to knowledge) or doxastic (relating to opinion) errors a knower or rational believer would be guilty of with respect to the goals of maximizing truth and minimizing falsehood in their belief sets. The omissive version concerns tokens of sentence-types of the following syntactic form p and I do not believe that p (where p is any logically or semantically consistent proposition). The commissive version concerns tokens of sentence-types of the following form p and I believe that not-p.
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